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I. INTRODUCTION
On March 4, 1996, the United States Supreme Court handed down its
surprising' opinion in Bennis v. Michigan ("Bennis 111,).2 The 5-4 opinion,
1. See, e.g., Marcia Coyle, Critics: Forfeiture Ruling Certain to Spur Reform, NAT'LL.J.,
March 18, 1996, at A12 (stating that the decision surprised forfeiture proponents and
opponents); Carol McHugh Sanders, Looking for Drama Among the Shadows, CHm. DAILY L.
BULL., March 18, 1996, at 3 (stating that Justice Ginsburg's majority-making vote was
surprising); Robert Reno, Reno at Large: Victim Sideswiped By Rolling Wreck of Justice
System, NEWSDAY, March 7, 1996, at A49 ('The 5-4 ruling was not the [C]ourt's finest
hour."); J. Kelly Strader, Taking the Winds Out of the Government's Sails?: Forfeitures and
Just Compensation, 23 PEPP. L. REv. 449 (1996) (commenting on the severe restrictions that
had been recently imposed upon governmental seizures and forfeitures); Joan Biskupic,
Supreme Court Agrees to Hear Disputes on Seized Automobile; Protection Against Property
Forfeitures May Be Widened, WASH. PoST, June 6, 1995, at A6 (pre-decision prediction that
the case would "lead to new protection for potentially innocent owners who lose their property
1
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authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, upheld the forfeiture of property that
had been used during the commission of a statutory violation.3 Additionally,
the opinion established that the Constitution affords no protection to an
innocent owner of that property.
In Bennis III, the Court was presented with the opportunity to clearly
establish the guidelines by which the government may seize property that has
been used to facilitate a crime.5 While the Court has rarely disallowed the
forfeiture of such property, it has often reserved the question of whether a
forfeiture would be upheld in the case of an innocent owner, while indicating
an anticipated reluctance to do so.6 However, when faced in Bennis III with
through forfeiture"); Robert M. Sondak, Justice to Rule on Forfeiture of Innocent Owner's
Property, 5 No. 10 MONEY LAUNDERING L. REP. 1, 5 (June 1995) (predicting that the Court
was "ready to rule that.., the Constitution requires some protection for the truly innocent
owner of property").
2. 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996) [hereinafter Bennis III].
3. Michigan v. Bennis, 504 N.W.2d 731, 732-33 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993), rev'd, 527
N.W.2d 483 (Mich. 1994) [hereinafter Bennis I]. Section 600.3801 of the Michigan nuisance
statute states in pertinent part: "Any... vehicle.., used for the purpose of lewdness,
assignation or prostitution... is declared a nuisance.... and all... nuisances shall be
enjoined and abated .. " Bennis 11, 116 S. Ct. at 996 n.2 (citing Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §
600.3801 (Supp. 1995)).
Section 600.3825 of the Michigan abatement statute states in pertinent part:
(1) Order of abatement. If the existence of the nuisance is established... an or-
der of abatement shall be entered.., which order shall direct the removal from
the building or place of all ... contents therein and shall direct the sale thereof in
the manner provided for the sale of chattels under execution....
(2) Vehicles, sale. Any vehicle ... found by the court to be a nuisance within the
meaning of this chapter, is subject to the same order and judgment as
any... contents as herein provided."
MiCH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 600.3825 (1987).
4. Bennis 111, 116 S. Ct. at 995-96.
5. Brief for Petitioner at 11, Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996) (No. 94-8729)
(LEXIS, Genfed, Briefs, "name (Bennis and Michigan)"); Brief of Amicus Curiae United
States in Support of Position of Respondent at 7, Bennis III (No. 94-8729) (LEXIS, Genfed,
Briefs, "name (Bennis and Michigan)") [hereinafter Brief of United States]. Two standards
were presented to the Court for adoption for application in future forfeiture cases. Although
the Court addressed the standards during oral arguments, it failed to discuss or adopt a
standard for application in Bennis III or any future cases. Transcript of Oral Argument at 10,
53, Bennis III (No. 94-8729), 1995 WL 712350 (Nov, 29, 1995).
6. See, e.g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 689-90 (1974)
[hereinafter Calero-Toledo] (stating that "it would be difficult to reject the constitutional claim
of an owner.., who proved not only that he was uninvolved in and unaware of the wrongful
activity, but also that he had done all that reasonably could be expected to prevent the
proscribed use of his property"); J. W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S.
505, 512 (1921) [hereinafter Goldsmith-Grant].
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the question of whether the Constitution protects the rights of an innocent
owner whose property has, without his or her knowledge or consent, been
used in violation of the law, the Court abandoned its reluctance, found that
no constitutional protections exist, and declined to establish any guidelines
by which to adjudge future forfeiture cases.7
Although the Court's decision was sharply divided, producing two
concurring opinions8 and two dissenting opinions, 9 the potential ramifica-
tions are great. In Bennis II, a vehicle co-owned by a married couple was
forfeited due to the husband's unlawful actions, despite the wife's lack of
knowledge or consent.10 Thus, while the husband's interest in the car was,
arguably, appropriately forfeited, the wife's interest in the car was also
forfeited, without compensation. The Court, in essence, has imposed a
punitive sanction on a woman for trusting her husband enough to purchase a
car with him.
By failing to establish any guidelines by which to adjudge future
forfeitures, and by further failing to establish the rationale it was relying
upon in deciding Bennis III, the Court has left itself, and courts nationwide,
with no apparent way to preclude most forfeitures. In fact, the Court has
seemingly denied itself the option of proscribing even the forfeiture of
property against the innocent owner whose property was stolen and subse-
quently used in the commission of a statutory violation. The Constitution
apparently provides no safeguard for any innocent owner, and to hold
otherwise would be irreconcilable with the holding in Bennis IlL
In examining the Court's decision, Part II of this case comment ad-
dresses civil forfeiture, examining the history and various purposes ascribed
to the practice of forfeiture. Part III explains the factual and procedural
background of the case. The facts of this case, although brief, are important
to understanding how Bennis III is distinguishable from the cases which the
Court cited in its opinion. Part IV of the case comment scrutinizes the
rationale of the Court's decision. Specifically, this section demonstrates that
the cases relied upon by the Court are distinguishable from Bennis III. This
section argues that by relying upon distinguishable cases dating back to the
early 1800s, the Court reached an imprudent conclusion. Part V explores the
standards which the parties advocated for adoption by the Court for use in
7. Bennis III, 116 S. Ct. at 996.
8. Id. at 1001 (Thomas, J., concurring); Id. at 1003 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
9. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting); Id. at 1010 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
10. Michigan v. Bennis, 527 N.W.2d 483,486 (Mich. 1994), aff'd, 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996)
[hereinafter Bennis II].
1997]
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future forfeiture cases. These standards were not addressed in the Court's
opinion; however, in light of the sharply divided Court in Bennis III, the
adoption of a standard by which to adjudge future forfeitures would help
establish a guideline to fairly, uniformly, and constitutionally apply to
forfeiture statutes and would impose limitations on the government's ability
to seize the property of individuals.
II. CIvIL FORFEITuRE: THE HISTORY AND PURPOSES
In our legal system, civil forfeiture has a history beginning in England.'
The practice began to take hold in the United States by the late 1700s.12 In
England, there were three justifications upon which forfeitures were based,
each viewed as imposing punishment: 1) deodand; 2) forfeiture upon
conviction of felonious or treasonous crimes; and 3) statutory forfeiture.'
3
At common law, the law of deodand was the forfeiture of property
considered to have "directly or indirectly caus[ed] the accidental death of a
King's subject."'14 This type of forfeiture had its historical origins in
"[b]iblical and pre-Judeo-Christian practices, which reflected the view that
the instrument of death was accused and that religious expiation was
required."' 5  When forfeiture eventually became a source of revenue,
forfeiture became known to serve as punishment for carelessness.' 6 How-
ever, the institution of deodand was abolished in England by an act authored
by Lord Campbell in 1846.17
The second justification of English forfeiture was based upon convic-
tion for felonies or treason.' 8 Under this type of forfeiture, "[t]he convicted
felon forfeited his chattels to the Crown and his lands escheated to his lord;
the convicted traitor forfeited all of his property, real and personal, to the
Crown."' 19 The justification for this forfeiture was that it served "to punish
felons and traitors, and [was] justified on the ground that property was a
right derived from society which one lost by violating society's laws. 20
11. Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 611 (1993).
12. Id. at 613.
13. Id. at 611.
14. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 680-81.
15. Id. at 681 (citing 0. Holmes, The Common Law, c. 1 (1881)).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 681 n.19.
18. Austin, 509 U.S. at 611.
19. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 682.
20. Austin, 509 U.S. at 612 (citations omitted).
[Vol. 21:685
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The third basis of English forfeiture, and the only type to take hold in
the United States, was premised upon a statutory violation.21 It provided for
the forfeiture of "offending objects used in violation of the customs and
revenue laws-likely a product of the confluence and merger of the deodand
tradition and the belief that the right to own property could be denied the
wrongdoer."22 Since the- adoption of the Constitution, it is upon this premise
that the practice of forfeiture has been based in the United States.
2 3
Civil forfeiture in the United States dates back to early admiralty cases
in which the United States government seized ships that were involved in
activities such as piracy, slave trade, or smuggling contraband goods.24
There are two significant admiralty cases involving the forfeiture of ships
found to have engaged in piracy that helped to set the precedent by which
civil forfeiture is applied today: The Palmyra25 and Harmony v. United
States.
26
In Palmyra, the ship had been commissioned by the King of Spain to
cruise as a privateer and was subsequently engaged in acts of piracy against
a United States vessel.27 The ship was captured by the United States and
was sent to Charleston, South Carolina for adjudication.2 8 In 1827, the Court
determined that the ship was properly forfeited to the government and that
the owner of the ship, however innocent or guilty, need not be convicted of
the offense for the forfeiture to be permissible.29 The opinion of the Court,
delivered by Justice Story, stated that the reason for holding the owner
accountable for the actions of his crew was that "[a] commission to cruise
[as a privateer] [was] a delegated authority, and c[ould] only proceed from
the sovereign.,, 30 Thus, once the King commissioned a ship, he became
vicariously responsible for the activities in which the ship was engaged
during the ship's commission. The premise of the rule permitting the
forfeiture of the ship is that "[t]he thing is here primarily considered as the
21. Id.
22. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 682.
23. Id. at 683. It is worth noting that the "First Congress viewed forfeiture as punish-
ment," and "'forfeit' is the word Congress used for fine." Austin, 509 U.S. at 613-14.
24. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 683.
25. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827).
26. 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210 (1844).
27. Palmyra, 25 U.S. at 2.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 14-15.
30. Id. at 4.
Davis
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offender, or rather the offence is attached primarily to the thing., 31 The
rationale for this is quite apparent: one cannot commit piracy without a ship.
Almost twenty years later in Harmony, Justice Story again delivered the
opinion of the Court which upheld the rule of Palmyra: "The vessel which
commits the aggression is treated as the offender, as the guilty instrument or
thing to which the forfeiture attaches, without any reference whatsoever to
the character or conduct of the owner., 32 However, the Court in Harmony
proceeded to explain the rationale behind the rule as being "done from the
necessity of the case, as the only adequate means of suppressing the offence
or wrong, or insuring an indemnity to the injured party. 33
The forfeited ship in Harmony, the Malek Adhel, belonged to the firm
Peter Harmony and Co., of New York.34 However, the Malek Adhel was
used, without the knowledge or consent of its owners,35 to commit acts of
piracy upon ships whose owners were British, American, and Portuguese.
36
Because some of the owners were foreign, their governments would have no
jurisdiction over the crew of the Malek Adhel and would, therefore, have
little success in procuring compensation for the owners' losses.37 Thus, in
addition to the fact that forfeiture of the ship would undoubtedly suppress
the crew's ability to commit further acts of piracy, forfeiture served the
purpose of insuring compensation for injured parties who may not otherwise
have been compensated.
In both of these cases the ships, despite the guilt or innocence of the
owner, were forfeited "[b]ecause the entire mission of the ship was unlaw-
ful[;] admiralty law treated the vessel itself as... the offender., 38 Further-
more, in many instances, especially those of piracy, such forfeiture was
considered inherently necessary. Thus, admiralty cases present two policy
aims behind civil forfeiture: 1) to eradicate the vessel which was itself the
offense by virtue of being too closely attached to the offense to be severed
from it and 2) to insure compensation to those injured by the vessel's
actions.
The application of forfeiture was eventually expanded to other forms of
property, and its purposes became "to punish, for deterrence and perhaps
31. Id. at 14.
32. Harmony, 43 U.S. at 233.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 229.
35. M at 221.
36. Id. at 229.
37. See Harmony, 43 U.S. at 233-34.
38. Id. at 1005 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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also for retributive purposes, persons who may have colluded or acquiesced
in criminal use of their property, or who may at least have negligently
entrusted their property to someone likely to use it for misfeasance. 39 In the
more modem cases,
forfeiture has been justified on two theories-that the property it-
self is "guilty" of the offense, and that the owner may be held ac-
countable for the wrongs of others to whom he entrusts his prop-
erty. Both theories rest, at bottom, on the notion that the owner has
been negligent in allowing his property to be misused and that he is
properly punished for that negligence. 4
0
In 1877, Justice Clifford delivered an opinion in which the Court
expanded the applications of forfeiture set forth in admiralty to other
properties. In Dobbins's Distillery v. United States,4 1 an owner lost his
property when it was discovered that his lessee was "defraud[ing] the
revenue" 42 by avoiding federal alcohol taxes regarding the distillery upon the
property.43 In this case, the Court upheld the forfeiture despite the innocence
of the owner because "he knowingly suffer[ed] and permit[ted] his land to be
used as a site for a distillery...."44 Thus, "the law places him on the same
footing as if he were the distiller and the owner of the lot where the distillery
is located."45 The Court then asserted that "[c]ases often arise where the
property of the owner is forfeited on account of the fraud, neglect, or
misconduct of those [e]ntrusted with its possession, care, and custody, even
when the owner is otherwise without fault."46 The Court proceeded to
establish, however, that "if [the lessee] abuses his trust, it is a matter to be
settled between him and his lessor."47 Furthermore, the Court elicited the
reasoning in Harmony that "the necessity of the case requir[es] it as the only
adequate means of suppressing the offence or wrong, or of insuring an
indemnity to the injured party. 48 Thus, the Court remained reliant on the
justifications of forfeiture set forth in the admiralty cases and began to
39. Bennis II, 116 S. Ct. at 1001 (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
40. Austin, 509 U.S. at 615.
41. Dobbins's Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395 (1877).
42. Id. at 396.
43. Id. at 397.
44. Id. at 399.
45. Id.
46. Dobbins's Distillery, 96 U.S. at 401.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 400 (citing United States v. Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210 (1844)).
1997]
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develop a focus on the "negligent entrustment" 49 of property by innocent
owners to persons who may, unbeknownst to the owner, involve the property
in the commission of a statutory violation.
In 1921, the Court heard J.W. Goldsmith, Jr. -Grant Co. v. United States
("Goldsmith-Grant").50 In this case, the seller of an automobile retained an
interest in the vehicle for the unpaid balance of the purchase price; however,
the purchaser engaged the vehicle in the illegal act of transporting liquor to
evade taxes.51 In its opinion, authored by Justice McKenna, the Court
upheld the forfeiture of the seller's interest in the vehicle despite his lack of
knowledge of the illegal activities.52 Again, the Court cited the rule that "the
thing is primarily considered the offender 53 as justification for the forfei-
ture. The Court went on to state that the vehicle was appropriately forfeited
as "[i]t is a 'thing' that can be used in the removal of 'goods and commodi-
ties' and the law is explicit in its condemnation of such things. 54
The Goldsmith-Grant Court then acknowledged that forfeiture statutes,
taken literally, could often result in the forfeiture of property belonging to
completely innocent owners and that
[t]here is strength... in the contention that, if such be the inevita-
ble meaning of the [statute], it seems to violate that justice which
should be the foundation of the due process of law required by the
Constitution. It is, hence, plausibly urged that such could not have
been the intention of Congress .... And it follows, is the conten-
tion, that Congress only intended to condemn the interest the pos-
sessor of the property might have to punish his guilt, and not to for-
feit the title of the owner who was without guilt.
55
However, the Court noted that "there are other and militating consider-
ations. 56 As such, the Court examined the purposes of forfeiture which
were premised on the idea that the "'misfortunes are in part owing to the
49. "Negligent entrustment" is a term which indicates that an owner, although innocent of
any wrongdoing, has been in some way negligent in entrusting their property to another who
has misused the property. Brief for Petitioner at 9 (citing RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS §
308 (1965)).
50. 254 U.S. 505 (1921).
51. Id. at 509.
52. Id.
53. Id. at511.
54. Il at 513.
55. Goldsmith-Grant, 254 U.S. at 510.
56. Id.
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negligence of the owner, and therefore he is properly punished by such
forfeiture.' ' 57  Thus, while the Court also noted the "guilty-property"
theory,58 the Court began to firmly recognize the punitive aspect of forfeiture
that began with the law of deodand.5 9 The Court upheld the forfeiture on the
several theories it examined and determined that the idea of forfeiture as
punishment for even the innocent owner's negligence is "too firmly fixed in
the punitive and remedial jurisprudence of the country to be now dis-
placed. ' 60 However, in response to the concerns that forfeiture statutes
might someday be applied in violation of constitutional provisions, the Court
stated that "[w]hen such application shall be made it will be time enough to
pronounce upon it."' 6' Thus, the Court began to recognize the potential for
improper forfeitures and reserved the question, as it repeatedly did, for the
appropriate case.
In 1926, the Court turned its attention to Van Oster v. Kansas,62 a case
very similar to Goldsmith-Grant. However, in Van Oster, it was the seller
who engaged the vehicle in the illegal activity and the buyer who lost her
interest in the vehicle.63 In the opinion authored by Justice Stone, the Court
upheld the forfeiture of a vehicle purchased by Van Oster but left it in the
possession of the sellers as partial consideration for use in their business.6
The car was, with the knowledge and permission of Van Oster, frequently
operated by an associate of the seller;65 however, unbeknownst to Van Oster,
the associate used the vehicle to unlawfully transport liquor in violation of a
Kansas statute.66 The Court upheld the forfeiture on the premise that even
innocent owners may become liable for the negligent operation of vehicles
by those to whom they entrust their property.67 Thus, in Van Oster, the
Court furthers the theory that innocent owners who negligently entrust their
property to those who misuse it may be held accountable for the misuse.
57. Id. at 511 (citations omitted).
58. Id.
59. Id. at510-11.
60. Goldsmith-Grant, 254 U.S. at 511.
61. Id. at 512.
62. 272 U.S. 465 (1926).
63. Id. at 466.
64. Id. at 465-66.
65. Id. at 466.
66. Id. (citations omitted).
67. Van Oster, 272 U.S. at 467.
Davis
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In the much more modem 1974 case, Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht
Leasing Co.,68 a leased yacht was forfeited when authorities discovered
marijuana aboard the yacht in violation of a statute that provided for the
forfeiture of "vessels used to transport, or to facilitate the transportation of,
controlled substances, including marihuana." 69 The Court, in its opinion
authored by Justice Brennan, upheld the forfeiture, rejecting the contention
that to forfeit the property of innocent owners without just compensation is
unconstitutional.70  The Court here, as in previous cases, examined the
history and purposes of forfeiture, accepting the theories that the "thing" is
the offender; 71 that forfeiture is "'the only adequate means of suppressing the
offence or wrong, or insuring an indemnity to the injured party;'' 7 2 and that
forfeiture serves punitive and deterrent purposes that "may have the desir-
able effect of inducing [property owners] to exercise greater care in transfer-
ring possession of their property. 73 However, the Court then qualified its
decision by stating:
[I]t would be difficult to reject the constitutional claim of an
owner ... who proved not only that he was uninvolved in and un-
aware of the wrongful activity, but also that he had done all that
reasonably could be expected to prevent the proscribed use of his
property; for, in that circumstance, it would be difficult to conclude
that forfeiture served legitimate purposes and was not unduly op-
pressive.74
The Court refrained from rendering an opinion on whether it would accept
this argument until presented with a more appropriate case.75 The Court
further qualified its decision by emphasizing that in Calero-Toledo the
property owner had "voluntarily entrusted the lessees with possession of the
yacht, and no allegation has been made or proof offered that the company
did all that it reasonably could to avoid having its property put to an unlaw-
ful use."
76
68. 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
69. Id. at 665-66 (citing Controlled Substances Act of Puerto Rico, P.R. LAws ANN. tit.
24, § 2101 (Supp. 1973)).
70. Id. at 680.
71. Id. at 684.
72. Id. (quoting United States v. Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 238 (1844)).
73. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 688.
74. Id. at 689-90 (citations omitted).
75. Id. at 689.
76. Id. at 690.
[Vol. 21:685
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Thus, the Court reaffirmed the justifications of forfeiture that have
evolved from admiralty, while providing an indication that it would consider
the establishment of a standard, the "all reasonable steps" standard men-
tioned in this case, by which to adjudge future forfeitures. The Court also
recognized that forfeiture is most often typified by the negligent entrustment
of property.
In 1993, the Court decided the most recent case on point, Austin v.
United States.7 7 In Austin, the Court refused to uphold the forfeiture of a
body shop and mobile home that was seized by the government after Austin
was found to have engaged in a single drug transaction within them.78 In this
case, the government presented the argument that civil forfeiture was not, as
the Court had held for well over a century, punitive, but rather it is remedial
in nature.79 The remedial purposes served by forfeiture, the government
contended, were the removal of the "'instruments' of the drug trade 'thereby
protecting the community from the threat of continued drug dealing,"' 80 and
compensation for the government's expenses of "law enforcement activity
and for its expenditure on societal problems such as urban blight, drug
addiction, and other health concerns resulting from the drug trade."81
However, the Court flatly rejected the government's contentions.
The reasons upon which the Court based its decision were two-fold: 1)
because, just as "'[t]here is nothing even remotely criminal in possessing an
automobile,'" 8 2 the possession of a body shop and mobile home are similarly
not criminal and, therefore, the contention that they are "'instruments' of the
drug trade" must be rejected8 3 and 2) because "'forfeiture of property... [is]
a penalty that ha[s] absolutely no correlation to any damages sustained by
society or to the cost of enforcing the law,"' 84 any contention that the
forfeiture provides compensation for such law enforcement is undercut by
"dramatic variations in the value of conveyances and real property"8 5 that
may be forfeitable.8 6 Therefore, the forfeiture of the properties was punitive,
77. 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
78. Id. at 605.
79. Id. at 620.
80. Id. (quoting Brief of United States at 32).
81. Id. (citing Brief of United States at 25, 32).
82. Austin, 509 U.S. at 621 (quoting One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380
U.S. 693, 699 (1965)).
83. Id.
84. Id. (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 254 (1980)).
85. Id.
86. Id.
19971
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serving neither the remedial goal of removing an instrumentality of crime
nor the goal of compensating the government for expenses relating to law
enforcement, and was subject to the Excessive Fines Clause.87 The Court
emphasized its holding by stating that '"[a] civil sanction that cannot fairly
be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained
as also serving either retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment, as we
have come to understand the term,', 88 and that "it consistently has recog-
nized that forfeiture serves, at least in part, to punish the owner.,
89
Thus, the justifications of civil forfeiture, beginning with Palmyra in
1827, have evolved into two: 1) the "guilty-property" theory, and 2) the
theory that the owner, although innocent, may be held accountable for the
misuse of his property by those to whom he entrusts it. Further, the Court
has derived a "negligent owner" premise that seemingly underlies both of
these theories. The "negligent owner" premise underlying the first theory,
that "[t]he thing is here primarily considered as the offender," 90 is that "the
owner who allows his property to become involved in an offense has been
negligent,"9' which is in turn premised upon Blackstone's explanation of the
law of deodand, which states that "'such misfortunes are in part owing to the
negligence of the owner, and therefore he is properly punished by the
forfeiture.,,,
92
The "negligent owner" premise underlying the second theory, that an
innocent owner may still be held accountable for the misuse of his property
by those to whom he entrusts it, is similar. "Like the guilty-property fiction,
this theory of vicarious liability is premised on the idea that the owner has
been negligent."93 However, this theory has specifically reserved to the
innocent owner the power to recover, from the wrongdoer, his losses.94
Thus, because both theories have been relied upon by the Supreme Court,95
and because the concept of negligent entrustment is fundamental to both, the
Court has determined that forfeiture is, at least in part, punitive.96
87. Austin, 509 U.S. at 622.
88. Id. at 621 (quoting United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989)).
89. Id. at 618. See, e.g., Goldsmith-Grant, 254 U.S. at 510-11; Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S.
at 686.
90. Palmyra, 25 U.S. at 14.
91. Austin, 509 U.S. at 616.
92. Id. at 616 (quoting Goldsmith-Grant, 254 U.S. at 510-11).
93. Id. at618.
94. Id. at 617 (citing Dobbins's Distillery, 96 U.S. at 401).
95. See, e.g., Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 684; Goldsmith-Grant, 254 U.S. at 510-11.
96. Bennis 111, 116 S. Ct. at 1000.
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Ill. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE
A. The Facts ofBennis v. Michigan
In October of 1988, Detroit police officers observed a known prostitute,
Kathy Polarchio, standing on a street comer "flagging" 97 passing vehicles.98
Shortly thereafter, the police officers observed a 1977 Pontiac, driven by
John Bennis, approach Ms. Polarchio, at which time she entered the vehi-
cle.99 The officers then witnessed the vehicle proceed one block, make a U-
turn, and stop. 1°° From the rear, the officers could see the heads of Ms.
Polarchio and Mr. Bennis. When they saw her head disappear toward Mr.
Bennis's lap, they approached the car and observed Ms. Polarchio perform-
ing fellatio on Mr. Bennis.' 01 Although the officers observed Ms. Polarchio
"flagging" and subsequently performing a sexual act in a vehicle, acts which
would be indicative of prostitution, the officers never witnessed an exchange
of money.10 2 Therefore, Mr. Bennis was arrested for gross indecency, 103 and
Ms. Polarchio was arrested the following day for accosting and soliciting. 0
Prior to Mr. Bennis's conviction for gross indecency, John and Mrs.
Bennis lost their jointly-owned 1977 Pontiac when a judge declared the
vehicle a public nuisance and ordered its abatement and subsequent sale. 05
The judge then stated that Mrs. Bennis, despite the fact that she was an
innocent owner, was not entitled to any compensation for her interest in the
vehicle because, after assessing various costs, "'[t]here's practically nothing
left.
,,,06
97. "Flagging" is a term used to describe the act of a prostitute signaling passing vehicles
to stop in an effort to solicit customers. Bennis 11, 527 N.W.2d at 486 n.2.
98. Id. at 486.
99. Id.
100. IUi
101. Id.
102. Bennis 1, 504 N.W.2d at 735.
103. Id. Mr. Bennis was initially charged with "indecent and immoral conduct," and the
complaint alleged that he engaged in the services of a prostitute and gross indecency between
a male and a female. However, Mr. Bennis was eventually only charged with gross indecency,
presumably due to the lack of evidence that Mr. Bennis did or intended to pay Ms. Polarchio
for her services. Id. at 735 n.1 (citing MicH. COMp. LAws ANN. §§ 750.338b, .449a (West
1992)).
104. Bennis II, 527 N.W.2d at 486 n.3.
105. Bennis I, 504 N.W.2d at 732.
106. Bennis III, 116 S. Ct. at 997 (citation omitted). But see id. at 1010 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) ("[N]othing supports the suggestion that the value of her co-ownership is so
insignificant as to be beneath the law's protection.").
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Approximately three weeks prior to the October incident,'w Mr. Bennis
and his wife purchased the car for $600 with money that Mrs. Bennis had
earned through baby-sitting and other odd jobs.10 8 The car was jointly-
owned by the couple and was driven that evening by Mr. Bennis to and from
work.' °9 Mrs. Bennis, believing her husband would return directly home
from work that evening, as he did every other evening, had no reason to
suspect or know that Mr. Bennis would instead be arrested for gross inde-
cency.110
B. Procedural Posture
After the trial court abated the interests in the car of both Mr. Bennis
and Mrs. Bennis,' 11 despite her lack of knowledge that her husband had ever
used the car in violation of any statutes,'1 2 and following Mr. Bennis's
conviction for gross indecency,'13 the Bennises appealed the abatement of
their vehicle to the Court of Appeals of Michigan." 14
The court of appeals reversed the trial court's judgment on three bases:
1) the prosecutor was required, but failed, to prove knowledge on the part of
Mrs. Bennis that the vehicle was being used in violation of the abatement
statute; 2) a single incident of lewdness, assignation, or prostitution in
violation of the abatement statute was insufficient to constitute a public
nuisance subject to abatement; and 3) the prosecution failed to prove an act
of lewdness, assignation, or prostitution by Mr. Bennis in violation of the
abatement statute.1
1 5
However, upon appeal by the Wayne County Prosecuting Attorney, the
Michigan Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals," 6 and in doing so,
stretched the realm of civil forfeiture beyond any previous application. The
court summarily held that: 1) while "lewdness" as used in the statute is
limited to acts that are committed in furtherance of prostitution, and further
107. Bennis 1, 504 N.W.2d at 734.
108. BISKUPIC, supra note 1, at A6.
109. Bennis 1, 504 N.W.2d at 737.
110. Bennis III, 116 S. Ct. at 1008 ("She had no knowledge of her husband's plans to do
anything with the car except 'come directly home from work,' as he had always done before;
and that she even called 'Missing Persons' when he failed to return on the night in question.").
111. Bennis I, 504 N.W.2d at 732.
112. Id. at 733.
113. Id. at732.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 733-34.
116. Bennis 11, 527 N.W.2d at 487-88.
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that although there was no exchange of money, Mr. Bennis's gross inde-
cency constituted "lewdness" for purposes of the statute; 2) a single act of
"prostitution" occurring in a vehicle in a neighborhood known for prostitu-
tion is an abatable nuisance, despite the court's notation that if the vehicle
had been driven to another neighborhood the vehicle would not have been
abatable;" 7 and 3) Mrs. Bennis's knowledge or consent of Mr. Bennis's
actions was unnecessary to abate the entire interest of the co-owned vehi-
cle.
8
At this point, Mrs. Bennis appealed her case to the United States
Supreme Court, challenging the constitutionality of the government's ability
to forfeit the property of completely innocent owners." 9 Mrs. Bennis's
appeal was based upon both a facial challenge and an as-applied challenge:
WHETHER A MICHIGAN NUISANCE ABATEMENT STAT-
UTE THAT PERMITS THE FORFEITURE OF A PERSON'S
PROPERTY IF IT IS USED IN A PROSCRIBED MANNER BY
ANOTHER PERSON EVEN IF THE OWNER HAD NO
KNOWLEDGE OF, OR CULPABILITY IN CONNECTION
WITH, THE MISUSE OF THE PROPERTY VIOLATES THE
DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMEND-
MENT AND/OR THE TAKINGS CLAUSE OF THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT (AS APPLIED TO THE STATES BY THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT); AND
WHETHER THE APPLICATION OF THAT STATUTE TO DE-
PRIVE A WIFE OF HER INTEREST IN AN AUTOMOBILE
SHE JOINTLY OWNED WITH HER HUSBAND VIOLATED
THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT AND THE TAKINGS CLAUSE OF THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT (AS APPLIED TO THE STATES BY THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT), WHERE THE FORFEITURE
RESULTED FROM A FINDING THAT THE HUSBAND EN-
GAGED IN A SEX ACT WITH A REPUTED PROSTITUTE IN-
SIDE THE AUTOMOBILE, AND WHERE THE RECORD ES-
TABLISHED THAT THE WIFE HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF
117. Id. at 491 n.22 ("We note that our position is limited to situations in which a nui-
sance condition exists, regardless of the city. Therefore, a vehicle could not be abated if the
same situation arose in another area of Detroit, such as Palmer Woods, where certainly no
such nuisance condition exists.").
118. Id. at 492.
119. Bennis III, 116 S. Ct. at 995.
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OR CULPABILITY REGARDING HER HUSBAND'S PRO-
SCRIBED USE OF THE VEHICLE. 12°
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Michigan Supreme
Court in a 5-4 decision. 12 1 The Court held that, based on a line of cases in
which various forfeitures were upheld, neither the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment 22 nor the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment
were violated: 123 Because "the forfeiture proceeding here in question did not
violate the Fourteenth Amendment, the property in the automobile was
transferred by virtue of that proceeding from petitioner to the State,"' 24 and
did not violate the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.'2s However, in
its decision, the Court relied upon distinguishable cases based upon medi-
eval rationale which affords no consideration to modem societal conditions
and failed to establish a standard by which to decide future forfeiture cases.
IV. THE CASES ARE DISTINGUISHABLE
A. Admiralty Cases: Forfeiture on the High Seas
Each of the several principal cases relied upon in the lead opinion is
arguably distinguishable from Bennis IlI. Furthermore, the aims of the
forfeitures in these cases are not advanced by the forfeiture in Bennis III.
The Court's opinion, authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, establishes
support for the forfeiture of Mrs. Bennis's interest in her and her husband's
jointly-owned vehicle by comparing the forfeiture to the forfeiture of ships
involved in piracy. 126 The Court begins its inquest with Palmyra and
Harmony.
In both Palmyra and Harmony, the Court upheld forfeitures of ships
that were found to have engaged in piracy based upon the principle that
"[tjhe thing is here primarily considered as the offender, or rather the
offence is attached primarily to the thing."' 27 The rationale supporting the
forfeitures is plausible. When the "thing" is so necessary and attached to the
120. Brief for Petitioner at 4.
121. Bennis II, 116 S. Ct. at 996.
122. Id. at 997.
123. Id. at998.
124. Id. at 1001.
125. Id.
126. Bennis 111, 116 S. Ct. at 998.
127. Palmyra, 25 U.S. at 14.
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offense that the offense could not be committed without it, it is reasonable
that forfeiture is an appropriate course of action with which to proceed.
However, unlike in Palmyra and in Harmony, in Bennis the vehicle in which
the act of gross indecency occurred was not necessary to commit the offense,
nor was the vehicle so attached to the offense as to be inseparable from it.
As stated by Justice Stevens in his dissenting opinion, "the forfeited property
bore no necessary connection to the offense committed by petitioner's
husband."'128 While the vehicle proved convenient, it certainly was not
necessary or attached to the offense, as were the ships in the admiralty cases.
Without the ships, the crews would have been hard pressed to have reached,
let alone engaged in "piratical aggression, search, depredation, restraint, and
seizure ... upon[,] the high seas.' ' 29
In support of the State of Michigan, it was posited that, like the ships in
Palmyra and Harmony,
[t]he forfeited car underlying the instant litigation was intimately
related to the offense punished. Mr. Bennis could not have found
other means of transportation adequate for acquiring Ms. Polar-
chio's services. The car was uniquely necessary both for getting to
the prostitution market and in 'hosting' the illicit sexual act. The
state should be allowed to focus on both the individual engaged in
the illicit conduct and the vehicle which facilitated that conduct.
130
However, contrary to this argument, Mr. Bennis could have committed the
act of gross indecency without the aid of the Bennis's 1977 Pontiac or any
other car. While the vehicle did provide transportation to the street comer
upon which he found Ms. Polarchio, he could have walked or taken a bus.
Once he had engaged the company of Ms. Polarchio, they could have
commenced their activities in an alley, on a bus bench, or in any secluded (or
public) place. It is implausible that every person who solicits the services of
prostitutes both has a car and uses it as the locale for their subsequent
activities. Furthermore, the Court accepted that had Mr. Bennis simply
driven the vehicle to a different neighborhood where a "nuisance condi-
128. Bennis III, 116 S. Ct. at 1006 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
129. Palmyra, 25 U.S. at 2.
130. Brief of the American Alliance for Rights and Responsibilities, The Alliance for a
Safer, Greater Detroit, The Eleventh Precinct Police-Community Relations Council, and The
Community Anti-Drug Coalitions of America as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 7,
Bennis III (No. 94-8729) (LEXIS, Genfed, Briefs, "name (Bennis and Michigan)")
[hereinafter Brief of American Alliance].
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tion"'131 did not exist the car no longer would have been abatable. However,
if the car were "primarily considered as the offender,"' 32 as were the ships in
Palmyra133 and in Harmony,134 it would be abatable regardless of the
neighborhood in which it was parked. Obviously, the car is not so necessary
and so attached to the offense.
In Harmony, while the Court upheld the rule in Palmyra, that the vessel
is considered the offender and is subject to forfeiture without regard for the
guilt or innocence of the owner, it also offered a rationale for such forfeiture
which provides further support for the proposition that these cases are
distinguishable from Bennis. The two reasons for permitting forfeiture, as
espoused in Harmony, are: 1) forfeiture is the only way to suppress the
wrongful activity and 2) forfeiture is the only way to insure that injured
parties will be compensated for their losses.
1 35
First, because the vehicle in Bennis is not necessary for engaging in the
act of fellatio, forfeiture of the vehicle will not necessarily prevent or
incapacitate Mr. Bennis from engaging in such acts in the future. Thus,
forfeiture of the Bennis vehicle is not even an, let alone the only, "adequate
means of suppressing the offence or wrong." 136 Undoubtedly, incarceration,
or perhaps a stiffer fine, would produce a more deterrent effect.
Second, because there was no "injured party ' 137 in Bennis III, the idea
of "insuring an indemnity"' 38 to one is incongruous. Furthermore, the reason
for forfeiting the ships for compensatory purposes was premised on the fact
that many of the ships' owners were located in other countries. Therefore,
the United States quite often lacked jurisdiction over the owners for the
purpose of awarding indemnity to the injured parties. 39 Thus, because the
illegal acts will not necessarily be suppressed by the forfeiture, and because
there are no victims to compensate, the necessity of the forfeiture in the
admiralty cases relied upon by the Court is not present in Bennis III, and the
rationale supporting the forfeitures in Palmyra and Harmony is inconsistent
with any rationale supporting the forfeiture of the Bennis vehicle.
131. Benis II, 527 N.W.2d at 491 n.22.
132. Palmyra, 25 U.S. at 14.
133. Id.
134. Harmony, 43 U.S. at 233.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See Harmony, 43 U.S. at 233.
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B. Forfeiture Comes Ashore
The next set of cases relied upon by the Court begins with Dobbins's
Distillery, in which an innocent owner lost his property due to the illegal
business practices of his lessee. 140 In that case, the owner was aware of the
use to which his land was being put-a distillery.141 Thus, the possibility
that the lessee might undertake illegal activities in the process of running the
business is a risk the lessor consequently accepted. In Bennis III, however,
Mrs. Bennis was completely ignorant of the use to which the couple's
vehicle was being put.142 And while, as the Dobbins's Distillery Court
noted, forfeiture cases often arise as the result of the "[e]ntrustment' 43 of
property, as one Justice asserted at the Bennis III oral argument, "[Mrs.
Bennis] didn't have to entrust it. It's half [Mr.-Bennis's] car."'144 Addition-
ally, it is unlikely that Michigan would permit Mrs. Bennis to sue her
husband to recover her losses, 45 an option provided the lessor in Dobbins's
Distillery,146 and if Michigan so permits, it would be futile for a wife to
attempt to recover from her husband money to which she is already entitled.
And, once again, the reasons proffered for upholding forfeitures' 47 do not
apply in Bennis III: Forfeiture of the vehicle will not necessarily suppress
the wrong, and there is no victim to compensate. Thus, as were the admi-
ralty cases, Dobbins's Distillery is distinguishable from Bennis IlL
The Court next relied on Van Oster, in which it upheld the forfeiture of
an automobile that was involved in the illegal transportation of liquor,
regardless of the innocence of the owner. 148 The decision was based upon
the premise that innocent owners may be held accountable for the misuse of
their property by those to whom they negligently entrust their property.'49
However, as established, Mrs. Bennis did not entrust the vehicle to her
140. 96 U.S. 395, 396 (1877).
141. Id. at 399.
142. Bennis Ii, 116 S. Ct. at 997.
143. 96 U.S. at 401.
144. Transcript of Oral Argument at 11.
145. It was implied during oral argument that Michigan would permit such an action
between spouses only in conjunction with a divorce action. Id. at 30. Despite their difficul-
ties, Mr. and Mrs. Bennis remain married; thus, recovery by Mrs. Bennis from her husband is
precluded. Aaron Epstein, Should Property Be Seized When Owner is Blameless? High
Court to Hear Forfeiture Case, SEATTrLE Tires, November 25, 1995, at A3.
146. 96 U.S. at 404.
147. Id. at 400.
148. Bennis III, 116 S. Ct. at 998.
149. Van Oster, 272 U.S. at 467.
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husband;'5 ° he had every right to use the car as he was the co-owner; and,
even if she had become aware of his illegal activities, "she would have had
no right to stop him from using the car."15'
Additionally, and perhaps more importantly, the circumstances in Van
Oster bear a distinct resemblance to the circumstances in the aforementioned
admiralty cases: As in the admiralty cases where the ship was so necessary
and attached to the offense as to be considered the offender itself, 52 the
vehicle in Van Oster also was as necessary and attached to the offense. The
Kansas statute that was violated in Van Oster prohibited the "transportation
of intoxicating liquor."'' 53 While other modes of transportation could have
been used in the commission of this activity, a vehicle is a "thing" that is
used for the purpose of transportation which is necessary for the violation of
the statute. Had the liquor been discovered in a "thing" that could not
facilitate its "transportation," then the offense of "transportation of intoxi-
cating liquor" could not have been committed.1 54 Discovered in a non-
mobile entity, the pertinent "transportation" element of the statute would
have been missing. Thus, for these reasons, Van Oster is distinguishable
from Bennis III.
Next, the Court attempted to analogize Goldsmith-Grant and Bennis
111.55 In Goldsmith-Grant, a vehicle that had been misused by the purchaser
was forfeited. The seller, who had retained an interest in the car to secure
the unpaid balance, lost his interest, as well, despite his lack of consent to or
knowledge of the illegal activity. The Court upheld the forfeiture on the
several theories it had espoused in previous cases, concluding that forfeiture
of an innocent owner's property as punishment for the negligent entrustment
of it to others is "too firmly fixed in the punitive and remedial jurisprudence
of the country to be now displaced."' 56 At this point, the Goldsmith-Grant
Court addressed concerns that the application of forfeiture would extend to
unconstitutional lengths: "When such application shall be made it will be
time enough to pronounce upon it."157 The situation in Bennis III can be
analogized to a scenario the Goldsmith-Grant Court suggested might trigger
such a review: "It is said that a Pullman sleeper can be forfeited if a bottle
150. Transcript of Oral Argument at 11.
151. Id. at 12.
152. Palmyra, 25 U.S. at 14.
153. 272 U.S. at 466 (emphasis added).
154. Id.
155. Bennis 11, 116 S. Ct. at 999 n.5.
156. Goldsmith-Grant, 254 U.S. at 511.
157. Id. at 512.
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of illicit liquor be taken upon it by a passenger."'58 The forfeiture of an
entire automobile because a grossly indecent act was performed upon its
front seat is much more similar to the preceding scenario than to the forfei-
ture of a ship that was engaged in piracy or to a vehicle forfeited for trans-
porting illegal goods. As such, the Goldsmith-Grant Court might very well
have recognized Bennis III as the application upon which it should pro-
nounce. When there has been no violation so connected to the vehicle as to
declare the vehicle itself the offender, 159 and when there has been no negli-
gence on the part of the owner to be punished, perhaps it is time to review
the forfeiture that is so rooted in America's jurisprudence.
The next significant case relied upon by the Bennis III Court is Calero-
Toledo in which a leased yacht was forfeited upon discovery that drugs were
being transported in violation of a statute. 16° The Court premised its opinion
upon the theories of forfeiture established in the several previous cases.
However, once again, the reasoning of the case relied upon by the Court is
inapplicable to Bennis III: As previously established, the Bennis vehicle can
hardly be considered the offender, forfeiture of the vehicle will unlikely
prevent a recurrence of the unlawful activity, there is no injured party in
need of compensation, and because there was no negligent entrustment, there
can be no deterrent or acceptable punitive affect. However, while the Court
upheld the forfeiture of the yacht upon the basic principle that the owner
negligently entrusted his property to the lessees, it reserved the question of
whether such a forfeiture would be upheld in the case of a truly innocent
owner.161 In its Bennis III opinion, the Court acknowledges the passage from
Calero-Toledo upon which the petitioner, Mrs. Bennis, relies: "'[I]t would
be difficult to reject the constitutional claim of... an owner who proved not
only that he was uninvolved in and unaware of the wrongful activity, but
also that he had done all that reasonably could be expected to prevent the
proscribed use of his property.' " 162 However, the Court opted to dismiss the
issue on the basis that the statement is "'obiter dictum,' and '[i]t is to the
holdings of [the] cases, rather than their dicta, that [the Court] must at-
158. Id.
159. Bennis 1I, 527 N.W.2d at 491 n.22 ("We note that our position is limited to situa-
tions in which a nuisance condition exists, regardless of the city. Therefore, a vehicle could
not be abated if the same situation arose in another area of Detroit, such as Palmer Woods,
where certainly no such nuisance condition exists.").
160. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 665-66.
161. Id. at 689-90.
162. Bennis III, 116 S. Ct. at 999 (quoting Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 689).
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tend. ' , 163 It is seemingly pointless, then, for the Court to expend its energy
on an apparently inert abstraction.
The final significant case upon which the Bennis III Court relied is
Austin.164 Despite being the most recent case on point, the Court affords this
case no analysis.1 65 The Court merely acknowledged that in Austin, it had
''no occasion ... to deal with the validity of the 'innocent-owner defense,'
other than to point out that if a forfeiture statute allows such a defense, the
defense is additional evidence that the statute itself is 'punitive' in mo-
tive,"' 166 and held that because "forfeiture serves, at least in part, to punish
the owner,"' 67 it is subject to the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines
Clause.' 68 However, the Court failed to mention that it therefore reversed
the forfeiture of property that, due to its punitive nature, was excessive.' 69 It
is confusing how the Court could then determine, in Bennis III, that
"forfeiture... serves a deterrent purpose distinct from any punitive pur-
pose, 170 after having concluded in Austin that forfeiture serving any retribu-
tive or deterrent purposes is punitive.' 71 And it is further confusing that in
Bennis III the Court acknowledged its determination that forfeiture is at least
partially punitive,172 yet failed to explain how imposing a punitive action
upon a completely innocent person is constitutional, or even why it is not
unconstitutional.
Initially, the most apparent distinction between the two cases is that,
unlike Mrs. Bennis, Austin himself was convicted of the offense by which
his property was forfeited. Thus, he made (and had) no claim of innocence.
Moreover, based upon the blatant rejection of the government's two-part
argument for upholding the Austin forfeiture, it is difficult to decipher the
rationale of the Court's decision in Bennis IlL
The first contention the government asserted in Austin was that forfei-
ture of the mobile home and body shop would serve to remove
"'instruments' of the drug trade 'thereby protecting the community from the
163. Id. (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 379
(1994)).
164. Id. at 1000.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Bennis IlI, 116 S. Ct. at 1000 (quoting Austin, 509 U.S. at 618).
168. ML
169. Austin, 509 U.S. at 622.
170. Bennis 111, 116 S. Ct. at 1000.
171. Austin, 509 U.S. at 621 (citing Halper, 490 U.S. at 448).
172. Bennis III, 116 S. Ct. at 1000 (citing Austin, 509 U.S. at 618).
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threat of continued drug dealing. ' , 173 However, the Court flatly rejected this
contention and determined that the punitive measure of forfeiture was
excessive because the possession of the property was "'nothing even
remotely criminal.' 174  This result should surely support the refusal to
impose such a punitive measure of forfeiture upon a completely innocent
person, since there is likewise "'nothing even remotely criminal"' in owning
a car. These decisions further appear readily conflicting: If the forfeiture of
the premises upon which a drug deal occurred would fail to "[protect] the
community from the threat of continued drug dealing,"'175 then the forfeiture
of a car in which an indecent act occurred surely will not serve to combat the
threat of continuing prostitution.
The second contention the government asserted was also rejected by the
Court. In Austin, the Court refused to permit the forfeiture of Austin's
properties for the purpose of compensating the government for costs in-
curred in performing its law enforcement duties176---the same costs that were
assessed against Mrs. Bennis. 177 The basis of the Court's rejection of this
contention was that the "dramatic variations in the value of [property]
forfeitable' 178 in these situations fails to provide "'a reasonable form of
liquidated damages, ' "1 79 thereby having "'absolutely no correlation to any
damages sustained by society or to the cost of enforcing the law."",A8 0 Thus,
the decision in Austin seems to provide support for rejecting the Court's
acquiescence in assessing "costs"' 8'1 against Mrs. Bennis's interest in the
forfeited vehicle. It seems incongruent for the Court to refuse the assess-
173. Austin, 509 U.S. at 620 (quoting Brief of the United States at 32).
174. Id. at 621 (quoting One 1958 Plymouth Sedan, 380 U.S. at 699).
175. Id. at 620.
176. Id. at 621.
177. See Bennis II1, 116 S. Ct. at 1002 n.* (Thomas, J., concurring).
178. Austin, 509 U.S. at 621.
179. Id. (quoting One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 407 U.S. 232, 237
(1972)).
180. Id. (quoting Ward, 448 U.S. at 254).
181. Bennis III, 116 S. Ct. at 998. In his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas struggles
with the definition attributed to the term "costs" as used by the trial court judge. There is
evidence that the judge was referring to costs such as law enforcement and costs of keeping
the car. Justice Thomas stated that if these were in fact the costs referred to by the judge, "the
State would still have a plausible argument that using the sales proceeds to pay such costs was
'remedial' action, rather than punishment." Id. at 1002 n.* (Thomas, J., concurring). This
attribution is completely at odds with the Court's holding in Austin which reiterated its
previous holding that "'the forfeiture of property... [is] a penalty that ha[s] absolutely no
correlation to any damages sustained by society or to the cost of enforcing the law."' 509 U.S.
at 621 (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 254 (1980)).
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ment of costs in Austin, and subsequently conclude that it is appropriate to
assess against an innocent person these same costs, costs to which the
forfeiture of property was deemed to have "'absolutely no correlation."'
182
This assessment seems especially inappropriate when allegedly the proceeds
of the forfeitures often serve to compensate the law enforcement officers
directly, not the government for its expenditure on law enforcement.
18 3
Had the Bennis III Court determined the outcome of the case prior to its
analysis, it is not difficult to understand its reason for "ignor[ing] Austin's
detailed analysis of. . . case law without explanation or comment."
184
Austin, even without the previously discussed case law, offers no reason for
deciding as the Court did and every reason for deciding as the Court did not.
Had the previous analyses not been evidence enough that the cases upon
which the decision was based were distinguishable, Austin's completely
irreconcilable decision should sway those not yet convinced. Thus, in
Bennis III, the Court's decision was rooted solely in cases that are distin-
guishable. The facts are distinguishable, the reasons for upholding the
forfeiture are distinguishable, the purposes of the forfeitures are inapplicable
to the case, and the characterization of the forfeiture in Bennis III is com-
pletely inconsistent with even the Court's most recent decision on point.
V. IMPLICATIONS AND RAMIFICATIONS
A. Implications of the Standards
Although presented with two standards, 85 the Court failed to adopt, or
even address, an appropriate standard by which to adjudge future forfeiture
cases. Either standard would have limited the government's ability to seize
the property of completely innocent owners, safeguarding the property rights
of individuals while concurrently ensuring the police powers necessary to
deter crime, punish criminals, and nullify the profitability of crime.
182. Austin, 509 U.S. at 621 (quoting Ward, 448 U.S. at 254).
183. Readers' Views, CINN. ENQ., March 14, 1996, at A19.
184. Bennis III, 116 S. Ct. at 1007 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
185. Brief for Petitioner at 11; Brief of United States at 7.
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1. The "Negligent Entrustment" Standard
The petitioner, Mrs. Bennis, advocated a "negligent entrustment"
standard that was suggested by the Court in the Calero-Toledo dicta.186 She
urged that
[b]ecause of the historic importance of property rights, the need for
a clear, uniform standard to guide the lower courts, and the need to
avoid "unduly oppressive" confiscations of property from innocent
owners like [herself], the Court should adopt the negligent entrust-
ment standard as the measure of culpability required to satisfy due
process in these circumstances.
18 7
The "negligent entrustment" standard is adopted from section 308 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, which states:
It is negligence to permit a third person to use a thing or to engage
in an activity which is under the control of the actor, if the actor
knows or should know that such person intends or is likely to use
the thing or to conduct himself in the activity in (a manner pro-
scribed by law).'88
This standard would permit the forfeiture of property belonging to an
innocent owner only if the owner had been negligent in entrusting his
property to a third person. Furthermore, this standard would "place the
burden on the government to demonstrate that an owner negligently allowed
another to use his property for illegal purposes."'
189
It is argued that Mrs. Bennis would have met the "negligent entrust-
ment" standard and defeated the forfeiture.19° The record reflects uncontra-
dicted testimony that Mrs. Bennis had no knowledge that her husband would
use the vehicle in a proscribed manner,191 nor any reason to believe that he
would do so.19 2 Furthermore, Mr. Bennis, as established at oral argument,
had no need to be "entrusted" with the vehicle due to his right, by virtue of
186. Brief for Petitioner at 9.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 15. "[A] manner proscribed by law" reflects the change suggested by peti-
tioner. These words replaced the actual language "such a manner as to create an unreasonable
risk of harm to others."
189. Brief of The Institute for Justice as Amicus Curiae In Support of Petitioner at 12.
190. Brief for Petitioner at 16.
191. ML
192. Id.
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being a co-owner, to use the car as he chose. 193 Thus, there is no "negligent
entrustment" for which Mrs. Bennis should be punished. Accordingly, Mrs.
Bennis met the "negligent entrustment" standard she advocated, and,
therefore, the punitive forfeiture of her interest in the vehicle without
compensation was inappropriate.'
94
While the respondent advocated the adoption of no particular standard
by which to adjudge forfeiture, both The American Alliance for Rights and
Responsibilities ("American Alliance") and the United States, in their amici
curiae briefs, encouraged the Court to reject the negligent entrustment
standard advocated by Mrs. Bennis,' 95 and the United States advocated the
adoption of an "all reasonable steps" standard. 196 The parties encouraged the
rejection of the "negligent entrustment" standard for two principal reasons.
First, it was suggested that such a standard would exempt many co-
ownership arrangements, placing a vast amount of property beyond the
hands of forfeiture, 197 including Mrs. Bennis's interest in her forfeited
automobile. This seemed unacceptable to the parties supporting the respon-
dent, for apparently their goal was to subject as much property as possible to
the threat of forfeiture. Second, it was suggested that the "negligent en-
trustment" standard is unacceptable because it limits the innocent owner's
liability to the time of entrustment. It was contended that this standard
should be rejected because "[i]n many cases, an owner can reasonably be
expected to take precautions against illegal use of his property after, as well
as before, entrusting it to someone else."'198 Thus, it was upon these grounds
that the parties believed the Court should reject the "negligent entrustment"
standard advocated by Mrs. Bennis.
2. The "All Reasonable Steps" Standard
While American Alliance was content to encourage the rejection of the
"negligent entrustment" standard, the United States advocated the adoption
of an "all reasonable steps" standard by which to adjudge future forfei-
tures.199 However, the goal of the United States was not to promote effi-
ciency in future forfeiture cases, rather the United States believed that "[t]he
193. Transcript of Oral Argument at 11.
194. Brief for Petitioner at 17.
195. Brief of United States at 8; Brief of American Alliance at 6.
196. Brief of United States at 7.
197. Brief of American Alliance at 14.
198. Brief of United States at 8.
199. Id. at 11.
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Constitution [b]ars [t]he [p]unitive [florfeiture [o]f [p]roperty [w]hen [t]he
[o]wner [a]lleges [a]nd [p]roves [t]hat [h]e [t]ook [a]ll [r]easonable [s]teps
[t]o [p]revent [i]llegal [u]se [o]f [t]he [p]roperty." 20°  Thus, the United
States, unlike the Supreme Court, believed that the Constitution affords a
degree of protection to the innocent owners of forfeited property. The
United States asserted:
[When an owner pleads and proves that he took all reasonable
steps to prevent the involvement of his property in the illegal con-
duct underlying the forfeiture .... [he] has, by definition, mini-
mized the foreseeable risk of illegal use and, in turn the risk of for-
feiture.... Moreover, an owner who can prove that he took all rea-
sonable, affirmative measures to prevent unlawful use is far less
likely to be in collusion with the person who uses the property ille-
gally than is an owner who merely asserts lack of knowledge or
participation in the illegal use.
201
Thus, because the United States contended that the Constitution does not bar
forfeiture of property when an innocent owner merely asserts lack of
knowledge or reason to know of the illegal use, adopting the "all reasonable
steps" standard would provide property owners an incentive to "take af-
firmative steps to detect and prevent the illegal use of their property,
[thereby] eliminat[ing] the need for judicial inquiry into the possibility that
the alleged innocent owner is in collusion with the person making illegal use
of the property.' 202
Although she contended that she would prevail under either standard,
Mrs. Bennis urged the Court to reject the "all reasonable steps" standard in
favor of the "negligent entrustment" standard.0 3 She so urged because the
vagueness of the former standard "has led to widely divergent innocent
owner determinations in federal and state cases, and to arbitrary forfeitures
of property."204 Furthermore, "because [the standard] does not require courts
to take account of the relationship between actual or constructive knowledge
of misuse and a duty to take preventive measures-courts have too often
applied that standard so as to permit a forfeiture in the absence of fault.
' 205
200. Brief of United States at 8.
201. Id. at 11.
202. Brief of United States at 11.
203. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 3.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 6.
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In other words, on its face, the "all reasonable steps" standard could aid in
the forfeiture of an innocent owner's property merely because the owner was
unaware that any steps could or should have been taken.
Mrs. Bennis contended that, were the "all reasonable steps" standard
applied, she would prevail on three principal grounds.206 First, Mrs. Bennis
asserted that her undisputed innocencea n precluded her ability to take any
steps to have prevented the act which led to the forfeiture of the Bennis
vehicle. 208
Whether one did all that could reasonably be expected to prevent a
misuse is necessarily a function of whether one knew or should
have known of another's criminal wrongdoing.... Indeed, if one
has no knowledge or reason to know of a wrongful use, then one
cannot be expected to take affirmative steps to prevent that use. As
to Mrs. Bennis, it hardly requires argument that a wife would, as a
matter of course, take all reasonable steps to assure her husband'sfidelity. 2W
While the state conceded that Mrs. Bennis had no knowledge of her hus-
band's illegal actions, 210 the United States contended that she failed to prove
that she took "all reasonable steps" to prevent it.21' Furthermore,
[t]he United States concedes that "it may be true in many cases that
a spouse who lacks reason to know that the other spouse will use
jointly owned property illegally cannot reasonably be expected to
take any precautions." And the amicus brief of the American Alli-
ance acknowledges that "an uninvolved co-owner would have to
know of the specific illegal use in order to take reasonable steps to
prevent it.2
12
Thus, the fact that Mrs. Bennis was ignorant of her husband's activity would
seem to exculpate her from proving that she had taken "all reasonable steps"
to deter the misuse. Hence, the contentions of the respondent, United States,
and amici curiae are completely inconsistent with Mrs. Bennis's innocence.
206. Brief for Petitioner at 17.
207. Bennis II, 527 N.W.2d at 486.
208. Brief for Petitioner at 17.
209. Id.
210. Bennis 1, 504 N.W.2d at 733.
211. Brief of United States at 15.
212. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 8 n.7 (citations omitted).
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Second, Mrs. Bennis asserted the fact that "she did not stand to benefit
financially or otherwise from the particular use he was found to have made
of the car,, 213 as further supporting her contention that, had there been steps
she could have or should have taken, nothing would have discouraged her
from doing so. This contention addresses any supposition that she may have
been "in collusion with [her husband in] making illegal use of the prop-
erty.1
214
Third, "the fact that [Mrs. Bennis] lacked meaningful control over her
husband's use of the property is another factor supporting the conclusion
that [she] took all steps that 'reasonably could be expected' to prevent the
proscribed use. 215 As previously established, Mrs. Bennis did not entrust
2 16
the car to her husband on October 3, 1988.217 John Bennis, as co-owner of
the car, had every right to use the car when and how he chose, and Mrs.
Bennis had no right to impede him from doing so.2 18 Thus, without the
power and ability to prevent her husband from employing the car as he
pleased, Mrs. Bennis was without the power and ability to take "all reason-
able steps" to prevent the misuse of the property. As such, she took "all
[the] reasonable steps" that she could.
B. The Flaws
Based upon the preceding analysis, it is apparent that each standard
possesses inherent flaws which would aid in, rather than prevent, the
misapplication of forfeiture. Thus, while the Court may have properly failed
to adopt one of the proffered standards, the failure to address the issue or
adopt an alternative standard left the Court's opinion incomplete. Without a
standard, and without any indication of the Court's position on a standard,
courts will be hard-pressed to apply the Bennis III decision in any way other
than to uphold the array of forfeitures encountered. Without a standard, and
without any indication of the Court's position on a standard, courts will be
hard-pressed to derive from Bennis III the characteristics of forfeiture that
determine its constitutionality or unconstitutionality, or its permissibility or
impermissibility.
213. Brief for Petitioner at 17.
214. Brief of United States at 11.
215. Brief for Petitioner at 17.
216. Transcript of Oral Argument at 28.
217. Bennis II, 527 N.W.2d at 486.
218. Transcript of Oral Argument at 31.
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The "negligent entrustment" standard, which strives to achieve a
219principle purpose of forfeiture, may place a greater limitation on forfeiture
than the "all reasonable steps" standard, but may inadvertently provide
persons whose property should rightfully be seized a loophole by which to
escape the deterrence of forfeiture. The "negligent entrustment" standard, as
advocated by Mrs. Bennis, restricts the time of entrustment, in a co-
ownership situation, to the time at which a co-ownership is created.2 In
Mrs. Bennis's situation, for example, the time of entrustment occurred at the
time she and her husband purchased the car together. 22' Thus, Mrs. Bennis
could be held accountable for negligent entrustment only if she knew or had
reason to know of her husband's tendency to solicit prostitutes at the time
the car was purchased. Had Mrs. Bennis become aware of her husband's
activities at any time subsequent to the purchase, she could not be held
accountable solely on the premise that there was no entrustment.
While the fact that there was no entrustment in the Bennis situation
does distinguish it from previous cases, the lack of entrustment should not be
the sole determinative factor in proscribing forfeiture. The "negligent
entrustment" standard fails to consider whether the property owner had any
knowledge of misuse by a third party to whom they entrusted their property
subsequent to the entrustment but prior to the time the misuse occurred. If
the owner becomes apprised of the misuse post-entrustment, the "negligent
entrustment" standard imposes upon the owner no duty or incentive to take
steps to prevent or diminish the misuse. Thus, the application and deterrent
nature of the "negligent entrustment" standard is quite limited and does not
best serve the intentions of forfeiture.
Likewise, the "all reasonable steps" standard has inherent flaws that
would theoretically permit the forfeiture of stolen property more readily than
the forfeiture of property that had been negligently entrusted. The "all
reasonable steps" standard forces the petitioner to plead and prove the steps
he took to prevent the misuse of his property. However, the respondent may
then produce "reasonable steps" that had not, but arguably should have, been
taken.
Furthermore, as the "negligent entrustment" standard imposes upon the
owner no duty to take precautions, the "all reasonable steps" standard fails to
219. The primary purpose being referred to here is the idea of punishing persons who
negligently entrust their property to others who misuse it. This is seen as underlying each of
the several theories of forfeiture. Austin, 509 U.S. at 618.
220. Transcript of Oral Argument at 12.
221. Id.
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consider whether the owner was aware of any wrongdoing. In the Bennis
situation, Mrs. Bennis was completely unaware of the use to which her
husband was putting the car. The United States acknowledged that without
knowledge of any potential misuse of the property, an innocent owner is
limited in his ability to prevent that of which he is unaware. The United
States, advocate of the "all reasonable steps" standard, then failed to suggest
any steps that Mrs. Bennis could or should have taken to prevent her hus-
band's illegal activity. But the United States insists that she failed the test.
Thus, if not guilty of negligent entrustment, how could any truly innocent
owner meet the standard advocated by the United States?
Although a victim of car theft is arguably the epitome of the innocent
owner, it can reasonably be foreseen that a person's vehicle may at some
point be stolen. Thus, in order to prevent the forfeiture of a stolen vehicle
that was misused by the thief, the owner must take "all reasonable steps" to
prevent the vehicle from being stolen, the key to preventing its subsequent
misuse. Perhaps the owner left his car unlocked, placed a spare key in a
"hiding" spot on the car which the thief found, or failed to arm the car with
an alarm. Certainly locking the doors, refraining from placing a spare key on
the car, and installing a car alarm are "reasonable steps" that could or should
have been taken. Because there were "reasonable steps" that the owner
failed to take, under the "all reasonable steps" standard, the victim of car
theft fails, losing his property because it was misused by a thief. Perhaps the
government contends that it would use its "prosecutorial discretion" and not
proceed with such actions; however, the "all reasonable steps" standard does
not prohibit the government from imposing punitive forfeiture upon the
victims of car theft if it so chooses.
Furthermore, while the "all reasonable steps" standard completely
ignores a basic premise underlying the theories of forfeiture, the punishment
of negligent entrustment, both the "negligent entrustment" and "all reason-
able steps" standards disregard each of the major theories and purposes of
forfeiture: The "guilty property" theory is irrelevant to the standards, as are
the purposes of suppressing the wrong and ensuring indemnity to an injured
party. Thus, each standard would permit improper applications of forfeiture
and would fail to recognize the theories and purposes that have propelled
forfeiture into modem jurisprudence.
C. An Alternative: A Standard Comprising Both Concepts
However, were the Court to institute a standard which would encom-
pass both a "negligent entrustment" and an "all reasonable steps" faction,
both the theories and purposes of forfeiture could be recognized, and the
1997]
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property rights of truly blameless individuals could be protected against
inequitable forfeitures. Because a basic premise of forfeiture has been to
punish the negligent entrustment of property, such a standard is appropri-
ate-even necessary. This would punish those who truly were negligent,
while serving to protect those who did not entrust their property, negligently
or otherwise. Thus, those whose property had been stolen would be free
from the threat of forfeiture, and those who co-own property are not made a
"guarantor for the behavior of the person who misuses the property. 222
However, it is important to then impose upon the owner, whether or not the
property was found to have been negligently entrusted, a "reasonable steps"
standard.22 Imposing this subsequent standard would impose upon the
owner a duty to take "reasonable steps" to prevent or diminish any misuse or
potential misuse of his property, if the owner had, at any time, become
apprised of such. Thus, a truly innocent owner would be protected from the
threat of forfeiture, while an owner who either negligently entrusted his
property and failed to take reasonable steps to prevent the misuse of it, or did
not negligently entrust his property but learned of a possible or actual misuse
of it and failed to take reasonable steps to prevent or diminish the misuse,
would be properly punished for his failure to control his property in a
responsible manner. Such a standard would protect the property rights of
individuals against unnecessary and improper forfeiture and impose upon
property owners a duty to take precautions to ensure that their property will
not be misused.
D. Ramifications ofBennis v. Michigan
Although the institution of a standard by which to adjudge future
forfeitures would be preferable than lacking any obvious guidelines, the
Court did not comply. Thus, bearing in mind the reality, there undoubtedly
are post-Bennis III ramifications that will be experienced. As previously
addressed, there presumably will be cases in which a court finds itself bound
to order or uphold the forfeiture of property that belongs to a truly innocent
owner. There may very well be cases in which a court finds itself bound to
222. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 7.
223. The "all reasonable steps" standard has been altered slightly here, dropping the "all."
It seems that courts would be constricted with such a qualification, as it would be difficult for
any petitioner to plead and prove all reasonable steps. Thus, by omitting the qualification,
courts have greater discretion to judge whether the "reasonable steps" that were taken by a
petitioner are sufficient to prevent a forfeiture.
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order or uphold the forfeiture of property that has been stolen from a truly
innocent owner. These scenarios, however, have been intimated.
What has not been intimated is an example of a more practical ramifi-
cation that could be more expansively suffered. While the preceding
commentary considered situations most similar to the situation in Bennis,
those who most often have an interest in property belonging to another that
is apparently at great risk are financial institutions. The Bennis decision will
place money lenders in an extremely perilous predicament-for every loan
they approve, they incur the risk of losing their interest in the property upon
which they loaned money.Y4 Faced with this possibility, "financial institu-
tions will be forced to restrict credit and banking availability to many
individuals."m Thus, it will be essential for financial institutions to conduct
in-depth background checks on potential customers to detect those that are at
risk for being the subject of a forfeiture proceeding. 2 6 However, the most
extensive background check will undoubtedly be unable to detect a person's
potential to be the victim of a forfeiture due to misuse of their property by a
third person. Moreover, "no prudent lender could justify a loan against the
risk that an honest and good credit risk customer could have their property
seized because the government asserts that the property was used to facilitate
a crime by another individual."227
In denying a customer financing collateralized by property based upon a
determination that he is at greater risk for being the subject of a forfeiture,
the lender "might violate [a] duty to the customer or anti-discrimination
laws. Indeed, the lender could even be subjected to defamation claims and
lawsuits, all of which would raise the cost of borrowing money."m Thus,
while the decision will probably permit the forfeiture of property from
innocent owners, adversely affecting those faced with the inequitable
forfeiture, the most daunting effects of the decision could infiltrate aspects
of our society not yet considered, inflicting ramifications not yet fathomed.
224. See Steven L. Kessler, Forfeiture and the Innocent Owner, N.Y. L.J., November 27,
1995, at 1.
225. Ma
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
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VI. CONCLUSION
While it is difficult to deny that forfeiture, if properly applied, can be a
useful and successful tool in combating and deterring crime, it is important
that the individual rights of innocent people are not compromised in the
process. The respondent in this case asserts that the crux of the forfeiture
debate lies within the question, "[d]o an individual's property rights out-
weigh a government's ability to exist?"229 To this question the respondent
replies, "'No."' 0 While the respondent's answer to the question is seem-
ingly appropriate, the question misses the mark. The "government's ability
to exist" hardly hinges on its ability to forfeit the property of innocent
owners. More importantly and more accurately, there is absolutely no
reason that the government's ability to combat and deter crime should not
exist without infringing upon the rights of innocent individuals. While the
Court's decision in Bennis III has apparently impeded the path to such a co-
existence, perhaps legislators will take heed and initiate a few impediments
of their own-impediments to the government's seemingly unbridled power
to forfeit, that is. Conceivably the Court will detect its own error and rectify
the situation in due time. As pointed out by George Will, "[i]n 1896, in
Plessy v. Ferguson the [C]ourt held that 'separate but equal' public facilities
segregated by race were compatible with the 14th Amendment's guarantee
of equal protection of laws. Later, the [C]ourt staged a protracted retreat
from that position., 231 Does Bennis III await the same fate? As aptly stated
by Thomas Jefferson in his first inaugural speech exactly 195 years prior to
the Bennis III decision, "[1]et history answer this question.232
Brooke D. Davis
229. Brief for Respondent at 10.
230. Id.
231. George Will, It's Time to Fix Forfeiture Law, NEWSDAY, March 10, 1996, at A42.
232. President Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1801, reprinted in
GREAT ISSUES IN AMERICAN HISTORY (Richard Hofstadler ed., Vintage Books 1958).
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